

Revision of DCID 1/14

Analysis of the ISWG Proposals

1. Introduction: Editorial.
2. Paragraph 4: Specific reference is made to eligibility for a TOP SECRET clearance as a prerequisite to nomination for SCI access. This statement is intended to disabuse any notion that a collateral clearance is equivalent to SCI access.
3. Paragraph 5b(1): "Cohabitant" is added to the definition of "immediate family" to reflect general acceptance of current life styles.
4. Paragraph 6: Editorial.
5. Paragraph 10j: In order to increase investigative coverage of individuals who have resided overseas, the Working Group reduced the 5-year period in this paragraph to one year. The reduction is considered to be important because of the need to provide continuity of an individual's activities and behavioral patterns.
6. Paragraph 10k: Editorial.
7. Paragraph 10l: "Cohabitant" is added to this paragraph to reflect general acceptance of current life styles and to clarify investigative requirements. The requirement to check "criminal" files of the FBI is necessary to assist an adjudicator in properly evaluating a spouse/cohabitant's relationship to the nominee for SCI access. The phrase "other persons to whom the individual is bound by affection or obligation" is also added to clarify the fact that provisions of Paragraph 5 may be met through appropriate investigation. Reference to Annex A is added for further clarification.
8. Paragraph 10n: This key paragraph establishes the requirement for a polygraph examination of all first-time nominees for SCI access. The general ground rules for use of the polygraph are set forth in the proposed Annex C (See Attachment 1). Based on the concern of some members that the average life-span of an SCI access may be no more than 3-4 years, based on studies which show that first-time nominees average 29 years of age, and based on the lengthy institutional success experienced by the two organizations which currently use the polygraph, the Working Group believes that it is imperative to administer polygraph examinations as part of initial screening.
9. Paragraph 11: This is another very important key paragraph involving use of the polygraph. As previously written,

this paragraph permitted an SIO to authorize SCI access in exceptional cases before completion of the investigation. Working Group members reported that the exception became almost routine in practice because of increasingly long lead time for completion of investigations. Under these circumstances, the problem is multifold. If an SIO grants SCI access before the investigation is begun, the security risk is very high. If the SCI access is not granted until the investigation is completed, many personnel cannot be utilized productively in sensitive SCI programs for an extended and costly period of time. Moreover, the overburdened investigative system simply cannot deliver a product of the required quality.

The revised paragraph permits an SIO to authorize SCI access prior to completion of the investigation by conducting the polygraph examination first. Such a procedure would eliminate any need for exceptional cases and allow immediate productivity of the individual pending completion of the investigation. The Working Group believes that other beneficial effects will accrue to enhance personnel security as a result of this revision:

- * Investigators will be relieved from time-urgent pressures.
- * The polygraph examination will provide additional specific leads for investigators.
- * Quality of investigative efforts will be improved.
- * Potential will be created for permitting a selective investigative scope.
- * Investigative manpower will be more effectively used.
- * Potential exists for saving a considerable amount of money.

10. Paragraph 12: A polygraph examination requirement is added to this paragraph to increase coverage and provide some continuity of an individual's activities before initial SCI access is granted. This requirement will allay adjudicative concern over a 1-4 year informational gap which could have some bearing on an individual's security eligibility. Two Working Group members object to the inclusion of this requirement on grounds that the status quo is satisfactory: Navy, and DIA.
11. Paragraph 14: This is a third key paragraph involving use of the polygraph. National agency checks, local agency

checks, and credit checks are eliminated from the periodic reinvestigation and replaced by a polygraph examination. Whenever necessary, of course, an SIO may authorize additional investigative efforts but the Working Group believes that conditions will seldom so indicate. As a result of this revision, almost 20,000 reinvestigations can be eliminated immediately, including the necessity for FBI fingerprint checks. Investigative resources will be freed for other work. The number of credit and local agency checks can be reduced drastically or eliminated altogether. The reduction of local agency checks will also alleviate our concern for restrictions placed by local and state jurisdictions on what information can be provided to federal investigators. Unauthorized disclosures will be rooted out at their source and the deterrence effect will be salutary. The Working Group firmly believes that the net effect will be an overall enhanced security program.

12. Paragraphs 16 and 17: The SECOM published "Minimum Standards for Security Awareness Programs in the US Intelligence Community" in 1980. Reference is made to it in these two paragraphs and it is attached as Annex D to provide a closer tie of security awareness standards to DCID 1/14.

13. Annex A; "Adjudication Guidelines, Cohabitation:" "Extra-marital" is deleted for editorial clarity.

14. Annex C, PURPOSE: This paragraph provides the basic intent.

15. Annex C, POLYGRAPH STANDARDS AND POLICIES: This paragraph sets forth the subjects which must be addressed by Intelligence Community organizations in order to establish and apply common standards. It is understood that polygraph examiners in most Government agencies/departments have already reached general agreement on such subjects; however, the Working Group recommends that the Acting Chairman, SECOM, request representatives of the Federal Interagency Polygraph Committee to form a separate, ad hoc WG and provide the SECOM with appropriately detailed operating standards, policies, and procedures.

16. Annex C, SCOPE OF POLYGRAPH TESTING: This paragraph specifies the topics to be covered by polygraph examinations as a basis for determining SCI access. The Working Group agreed to limit these topics to focus narrowly on so-called counterintelligence and unauthorized disclosure matters although some members were concerned that additional topics should be included to cover Annex A and to complement the investigative requirements of DCID 1/14. The Working Group believes that topics i, j, k, and l have a direct relationship to such counterintelligence concerns. The Working Group also believes that spontaneous admissions on the part of an examinee which are serious in nature should be reported to the adjudicating authorities, especially if the admissions relate to violation of Espionage statutes or offenses against the U.S. Code.

The Navy Working Group member objected to the inclusion of topics i and j on grounds that questions derived from these topics would focus on "lifestyle" matters of private concern.

17. ANNEX C, USE OF POLYGRAPH RESULTS: A polygraph examiner should not be involved in access decisions with regard to his own cases. This paragraph is written to conform with existing practice within the agencies now using the polygraph.
18. ANNEX C, EFFECTIVE DATE: In the interest of security and resource savings, the Working Group believes that polygraph use for initial screening and reinvestigations should begin as soon as possible. If "grandfathering" becomes necessary, it should be based on length of time in SCI access.